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Kinship and Marriage in Massachusetts
Public Employee Retirement Law: An
Analysis of the Beneficiary Provisions,
and Proposals for Change
J ennifer Wriggins*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly observed that "the American family" is changing. 1
Many statutes enacted earlier in the twentieth century, as well as
numerous employer--supplied benefits, were based on a picture of a
family consisting ofa working father and a stay-at-home mother, together
raising their children.2 This picture, however, was never a completely

* Attorney, Pressman &:. Kruskal, Cambridge, Massachusetts. I am grateful for
the help ofMary Ann Case, Elyse Cherry, Susan Farnsworth, Lillian Gonzalez, David
Hofstetter, Paul T. Hynes, Martha McCluskey,Jean A. Musiker, Sive Neilan, Barbara
J. Phillips of the Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration, Mark
Russo of the Massachusetts State Retirement Board, Peter Sacks, Jane Schacter,
Barbara]. Ware of the Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration,
Gretchen Van Ness, Evan Wolfson, and the editors of the New England Law Review.
Mary L . Bonauto's assistance was invaluable. The views expressed herein are my
own; I take full responsibility for any errors.
1. Only One U.S. Family in Four is 'Traditional, • N.Y. TIMES, January 30, 1991,
at A19. According to the article, in 1990 only 26% of American households were
made up of a married cou ple and one or more children under eighteen. Id. See also
BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 4-6, 20-21, 51-54
(1986); Recognizing Non-Traditional Families, SPECIAL REP. SERIES ON WORK&:. FAMll..Y
(BNA) No. 38 (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter BNA REPORT No. 38]; Craig A. Bowman &
Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social AnalysiS of Dom.estic Parl
nership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164-65 (1992); Jerhold K. Footlick, What
Happened to the Family?, NEWSWEEK. Special Issue, 1989, at 14.
2. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 89C (1961) (Annuities to Certain Widows of
Employees Killed, or Who Died from Injuries Received, In Line ofDuty). Many such
statutes were struck down as unconstitutional in the 1970s as discriminatory on the
basis of sex. For example, a statute providing that spouses of male members of the
armed services were "dependents" for purposes of receiving military benefits, but
spouses of female members were not "dependents" unless actually dependent on
their wives for more than half their support, was held unconstitutional in Frontiero
991

992

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:991

accurate representation of reality, particularly for women who were not
white.3 In recent years, recognition has grown that the image of the
"traditional" American family does not match United States demograph
ics4 and, consequently, that some of the laws based on this image
operate unfairly when applied to those who live in "nontraditional"
families:5 Over the last decade, the concept of extending certain
employment benefits to "domestic partners"6 of employees in order to
relieve some of these inequities has gained considerable ground in both
the private and public sectors.7 In spite of these advances, however,
domestic partnership ordinances and programs have thus far failed to
deal with inequities in existing retirement programs.
A paradigmatic example of this unfair operation of laws, which has
received scant public attention, is found in the beneficiary provisions of
the Massachusetts Contributory Retirement System for Public Employees
(retirement statute).8 The retirement statute is a critical arena in which
to examine these issues because it governs the retirement of over

v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). A Social Security Act provision that awarded
survivor's benefits to widows, but not to widowers responsible for dependent
children, was struck down in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
3. BLACK WoMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 227-84 {Gerda Lerner ed, 1972);JUUE A.
MATIHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 94-97, 133-36 {1982).
4. BERGMANN, supra note 1, at 4-6, 20-21; DiE AMERICAN WOMAN 1990-1991: A
STATUS REPORT 372-74, tbls. 10-12; 376 tbl. 14; 377 fig. 5; 378 tbl. 16; 380 fig. 6; 382
fig. 7 (Sara E. Rix ed. 1990); MATIHAEI, supra note 3, at 279-93; Footlick, supra note
1, at 16-17.
5. See, e.g., BNA Report No. 38, supra note 1; Cornish, supra note 1, at 1165-86;
Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace, 51 OHIO ST.
LJ. 1067, 1068-69 (1990); David Link, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the
Family Commitments ofSame.Sex Couples, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1055, 1057-58, 1079-80,
1099, 1114-18 {1990); John Wofford & Charles Colbert, Sexual Orientation in the
Workplace: The Strategic Challenge, in COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS MANAGEMENT,
Summer 1993, at 15; Lisa Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple,
12 CARDozo L. REV. 681, 681-84 (1990). See Massachusetts Governor Weld's Exec.
Order No. 340, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 134, 145-46.
6. While the phrase "domestic partner" has no single meaning, it is generally
intended to apply to those in an emotionally committed, co-habitating, intimate,
nonmarital relationship. See infra text accompanying notes 134-45.
7. See, e.g., Cornish, supra note 1, at 1188-92; see Massachusetts Governor
William F. Weld Executive Order No. 340 {1992); Boston Mayor Raymond L. Flynn
Executive Order, Extension ofCertain Personnel Benefits (Feb. 12, 1993); CAMBRIDGE,
MAss. MUN. CODE ch. 2, § 119 {1992); BROOKLINE, MAsS. DOMESTIC PARTNERS BY
LAW (June 2, 1993); Labor Letter: A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in
Offices, Fields and Factories, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 25, 1994, at AI; DavidJ.Jefferson, Gay
Employees Win Beneftts for Partners At More Corporations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1994.
at Cl, C5; see infra text accompanying notes 134-41.
8. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 9, 12{2) (1992). See text accompanying notes 21-132.
This article does not deal with private employers' retirement benefits, nor does it
discuss public retiremen~ systems nationwide. Public employment retirementsystems
in the other New England states are discussed infra at notes 14, 76, and 117.
·
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400,000 individuals in the Commonwealth, the largest number of
individuals governed by any single retirement program in Massachu
setts.9 Retirement programs are an extremely important part of an
employee's compensation package, particularly in the context of public
employment. 10 Providing for employees during their retirement, and
in some fashion for their dependents, is one of the common goals and
characteristics of retirement plans.11 Employee benefits, including
retirement benefits, as a whole average 30.4 percent of the total com
pensation of public sector employees.12 Retirement savings make up
approximately 7.6 percent of compensation for public sector em
ployees.19 Unlike a private employer's retirement plan, however,
Massachusetts's retirement statute is a manifestation of the legislative will
and reflects public policy. Thus, any inequities found are more troubling
than those that might be found in private retirement plans. Such
inequities are also subject to greater public debate, and perhaps to
change, than those of a private retirement system. 14
Part ll of this article outlines the operation of the Massachusetts
retirement statute, codified at Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General
Laws. The statute's beneficiary provisions, discussed in Part ill of this
article, contain a rigid and limited list of relatives who may receive cer
tain valuable benefits after an employee's death. 15 These statutory
provisions significantly restrict the opportunity of public employees with
9. Retirement Boards of the Commonwealth, (Retired State, County, and
Municipal Employee's Association of Massachusetts, June 1992). See also Publ~
Employee Retirement Administration, REPORT FOR niE STATE EMPLOYEES' CONTRIBUfO
RY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 13 {1992} [hereinafter PERA REPORT].
10. See infra notes 12-13.
11. jEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, ed., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK 1-2, 1-6, 10-25,
10-26, 10-27, 33-5 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENE.FI!S HANDBOOK].
12. EMPLOYMENT COST INDEXES AND LEVELS {BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Sept.
1993), at 101, tbl. 26 [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT COST INDEXES AND LEvELs].
13. Id. at 102, tbl. 27. See id. at 10-17, 89, 93-94. For private employment,
employment benefits constituted 28.7% oftotal compensation as ofMarch 1993. Id.
at 14, tbl. 11. For private employment, retirement savings made up only 2.9% of
total compensation as of March 1993. Id. at 93, tbl. 18.
14. Two New England states, Maine and Connecticut, have revised their public
employee retirement statutes in ways which make them operate more equitably
towards those in "nontraditional" families. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17953
{West 1989) (amend. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-165(a)(2),(3) {West 1988);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-165a(c) (West 1988) {amend. 1983, P.A. 83-533, § 12).
The public retirement statutes of the other New England states generally contain
fewer of the types of limitations and inequities discussed in this article. See R.L GEN.
LAws§§ 36-10-18. 36-10-19.1{b), 3&-10-21, 36-10-23,36-10-24 (1956); but see R.I. GEN.
L. § 36-10-20 (1956); see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 100-A:9, 100-A:ll. 100-A:12
(amended 1991 8c 1993), 100-A:13 (amended 1992). 100-A:13(a) {1990). See VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 464, 465, 468 (1985). But see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 100·A:8
(1990). See infra no~es 76 & 117.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 38-112.

994

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:991

relationships that fall beyond the law's traditionally recognized ties of
blood and marriage to provide for those individuals for whom they are
responsible after their deaths.16
Part IV of this article examines several other provisions of the
retirement statute, including those addressing accidental death benefits,
in which the bright-line status of marriage is not the sole determinant on
which entitlement to certain benefits tums. 17 In various circumstances,
the marital relationship's duration, nature, and status at the time of the
employee's death are considered in a'lvarding certain benefits. Eligibility
for these benefits turns on both strict rules and case-by-case determina
tions as to the fairness and approgriateness of providing certain benefits
to employees and their families. 8 Given this legislative concern with,
and the precedent of examining, the duration, substance, and nature of
individual employees' marriage relationships, it is inconsistent and
unnecessary to deny benefits to survivors of employees who are not in
legally recognized relationships, regardless of the duration, substance,
and nature of those relationships. 19
Part V of the article examines several legislative options to further the
goal ofbasic fairness to employees while protecting other interests of the
system, and in conclusion recommends several specific changes.20
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MASSACHUSETI'S PUBUC EMPLOYEE
CONI'RIBUI'ORY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
A.

The Basic Structure

The retirement system is part of the benefits package offered to the
vast majority of Massachusetts's full-time public employees.21 Estab
lished in 1946, participation in the system is mandatory for employees

16. See infra text accompanying notes 60-112.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 113-32.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 113-32. The tension between bright-line
rules and case-by-case determinations is of course not unique to the retirement
statute, but recurs throughout law. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TExT 19, 21-23 (3d ed 1972); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL
SnmiES 15-17 (1987); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of]tuiicialDecision, 36 HARv. L. REv.
940 {1923).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 60-112, 132-33. For other discussion of the
retirement statute, see, e.g., Maria C. Walsh, A judicial Guide to Labor and Employment
Law 314-36 (1990) [hereinafterjudicial Guide]; Maureen Duval& Paul Todisco, Pen
sion Reserves Investment Management Board's Overview of the Massachusetts Public
Employee Contributory Retirement Law (May 15, 1992) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Overview).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 133-74.
21. ' Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at 314.
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who are eligible to parti.cipate.22 Depending on when the employee
entered into public employment, thus becoming a "member" of the
system,25 between five and eight percent of the employee•s gross
paycheck is deducted from each member's f.aycheck as a mechanism for
partially funding the retirement system. 4 Retirement is generally
achieved after twenty years of creditable service.25
An individual's retirement allowance is based on a formula involving
the employee•s age at retirement, years of service, the type of job the
employee performed, and several other factors. 26 The retirement allow
ance consists of two parts. The annuity portion, based on the member•s
own contributions from payroll deductions comprises roughly ten

22. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 22(1)(b) (1992); Overview, supra note 19, at 1.
23. A "Member" in the context of the retirement statute is defined as:
any employee included in the state employees' retirement system, in the
teachers' retirement system or in any county, city, town, the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, or the
Massachusetts PortAuthority contributory retirement system, the Massachu
setts Bay Transportation Authority police retirement system, the Blue Hills
Regional Vocational school retirement system, the Minuteman Regional
Vocational Technical SchoolDistrict Employees' retirem~tsystem, and the
Greater Lawrence Sanitary District Employees' retirement system,
established under the provisions of sections one to twenty-eight, inclusive,
or under corresponding provisions or earlier laws, and if the context so
requires, any member of any contributory retirement system established
under the provisions of any special law.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992). There are in fact 106 contributory retirement
systems in the Commonwealth. PERA REPORT, supra note 9, at 19. The current
retirement law gathers togethermany pre-existing statutes regulating public employee
retirement systems. Bianchi v. Retirement Board of Somerville, 359 Mass. 642, 647,
270 N.E.2d 792, 795 {1971). For convenience, references in this article to public
employees generally include any public employees covered by the retirement statute,
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 32. The retirement statute defines "Board" as
"the appropriate retirement board established under the provisions of section twenty
having jurisdiction of any contributory retirement system established under the
provisions of sections one to nventy-eight inclusive .. . ." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1
(1992).
24. MAss. GEN. L. cb. 32, § 22(1)(b) (1992); Overview, supra note 19, at 3.
25. "Creditable service" is "all membership service, prior service and other service
for which credit is allowable to any member under the provisions of sections one to
twenty-eight inclusive." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992). Details as to the
application of the term "creditable service" are found in MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 4
(1992). Exceptions to this twenty year standard apply to members of the retirement
system who began their state employment beforejanuary 1, 1978. MAss. GEN. L. ch.
32, § 5 (1992). These members may retire at any time after age fifty-five regardless
of the number of years served. See MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 1, 4 (1992);judi&ial
Guide, supra note 19, at 314. Members employed January 1, 1987 or thereafter, after
reaching age fifty-five, can retire after ten years of creditable service. See MAss. GEN.
L. ch. 32, § 5 (1992).
26. See MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 5 (1992).
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percent of the allowance.27 The second p~ or pension portion,
comprises the remainin~ ninety percent, or so, provided by the
governmental employer. The amount of retirement allowance also de
pends on the type of allowance chosen by the employee.29
Several provisions of the statute permit a member to designate a
beneficiary to receive certain pa~ents after the member's death. As
discussed in more detail below, 0 the statute gives members consider
able, but not unlimited, control over the disposition both of their own
contributions from payroll deductions and of interest on those
contributions}n In contrast, members' control over the choice of
beneficiary for their retirement allowance, which includes the much
more valuable pension portion, is strictly limited.82 The retirement
statute also includes various other provisions, discussed below, pertaining
~o benefits that certain relatives may receive after a member's death.83

27. Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at 314. "Annuity" is defmed as "payments
dependent upon the continuance of life of any member and derived from his
accumulated regular deductions or from his accumulated additional deductions, if
any, or from both, as the case may be." MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 1 (1992). "Addi
tional deductions" are amounts that a member can specify be deducted from his
paycheck. Id. "Pension" is defined as "payments dependent upon the continuance
of life of any member or beneficiary and derived from contributions made by the
appropriate governmental unit." Id. "Retirement allowance" is defined as "the sum
of the amount of the annuity and the amount of the pension provided for in sections
one to twenty-eight inclusive." Id.
28. Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at 314.
29. Section 12(2) contains three options for types of retirement allowances from
which an employee can select one. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) (1992). See infra
text and accompanying notes 50-65.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 42, 46-49.
31. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). See infra text accompanying notes
40-41, 43-45, and chart accompanying notes 66-75.
32. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Options (c), (d) (1992). See infra chart accom
panying notes 66-75. An additional issue is that of health insurance for employees
of the Commonwealth and their dependents. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter
32A, § 5 provides that state employees are automatically entitled to receive health
insurance. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 32A. § 11 states that the surviving
spouse or surviving dependent of an employee or retired employee of the
Commonwealth may continue general health coverage. A "dependent" is defined
as "an employee•s spouse, his unmarried children under nineteen years of age, and
any child nineteen years of age or over who is mentally or physically incapable of
earning his own living ...." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32A, § 2(d) (1992). This issue,
although it has been much discussed in the context of domestic partnerships, is
beyond the scope of this article. See supra notes 5, 7, and infra notes 134-41.
33. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 9(1), 12(2) Option (d), 12B (1992). See text
accompanying notes 113-32.
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B. Funding ofthe REtirement System
Although deductions from employees' wages are used partially to
fund the retirement system, the system was not initially intended to be,
nor is it, funded entirely from workers' contributions.!H The remainder
of the system's obligations were left to be funded on a "pay-as-you-go"
basis, meaning that appropriations must be made annually for payment
of current benefits to retirees.35 Due to the large amount of liabilities
for members' past service (unfunded liabilities), and the uncertainty of
tax revenues from which to fund anticipated liabilities, the General
Court orga:I!ized an investigation into the operation of the law in the
early 1980s.36 This investigation eventually resulted in the passage of
several pieces of legislation aimed at streamlining the system and
creating several reserve funds with the goal of eventually eliminating
unfunded liabilities.87
ffi.
A.

CHOICE OF BENEFICIARY PROVISIONS

The Statutory Framework

The distinction between a member's own contributions (the annuity),
and the pension itself, which consists of contributions derived from the
appropriate governmental unit, is critical to an understanding of the
retirement system.sa A "retirement allowance" consists of the sum total
of the member's annuity and pension.39 It is also useful to bear in
mind the distinction between a member dying before reaching retire
ment, and a member dying after reaching retirement.
1. Dying Before Retirement
If a member dies before retirement, one of two things can occur
regarding his _or her benefits, assuming that no exceptions apply. First,
if the member has chosen a beneficiary from a limited list of relatives, 40
a one-time immediate payment of two-thirds of the total retirement

34. See Overview, supra note 19, at 3.
35. !d.
36. Id.
37. !d.; MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 22, 23 (1992); see also PERA REPORT, supra note
9, at 5.
38. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992).
39. Id.
40. If a m ember dies before retirement, without having chosen a beneficiary for
the Member Survivor Allowance, the member's spouse may elect to receive the
allowance in some circumstances. MAss. GEN. L . ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992).
This alternative way of obtaining the Member Survivor allowance is discussed in
more detail at text accompanying notes 124-32.
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allowance to which he or she would have been entitled had retirement
taken place on the date of death will be paid to the chosen relative. 41
Alternatively, if the employee has chosen a beneficiary not on the limited
list of relatives, only his or her contributions, together with accrued
interest, can be paid to the non-relative beneficiary.42 The beneficiary
under the first scenario, i.e., chosen from the statute's limited list, ·will
generally receive a much greater payout than the beneficiary under the
second option.
Each of these two outcomes will be discussed in more detail. Under
the first scenario, a member may nominate a beneficiary '·within a narrow
list of relatives as a "Member Survivor." If the member dies before
reaching retirement, the "Member Survivor" will get a payout equal to
two-thirds of the total amount of the "Option (c)" retirement allowance
to which the member would have been entitled had retirement taken
place on the date of death.43 The Option (c) retirement allowance is
one of several retirement allowance options from which members may
choose upon their retirement. 44 The only persons that a member may
nominate to receive this Member Survivor Allowance are the member's
"spouse[,] former spouse who has not remarried, child, father, mother,
sister or brother . .. ."45
Regarding the second scenario, the payment of a member's con
tributions to a beneficiary, any member may nominate on a prescribed

41. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992).
42. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(b}, (c) (1992).
43. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2), Option (d) (1992). Note that the Member
Survivor Allowance only applies if the employee dies before retirement. See infra
chart accompanying notes 66-75.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 56-65.
45. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option {c) (1992). According to Option (c),
if a spouse receiving an allowance as a beneficiary dies, leaving children of the
beneficiary and the deceased employee who are under eighteen years of age, the
children's guardian will receive the spouse's share. Id. The option further provides
that if a member has not designated an eligible beneficiary other than his or her
spouse under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 32, § 12{2) Option {c), with some
conditions the spouse may elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, § 12{2)
Option {d). If the spouse elects to receive the allowance, the spouse will receive an
additional allo·wance for each minor, incapacitated, or under twenty-two year old
student child. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12B (1992). If the spouse does not elect
to receive the allowance, and prior to death the member had designated a beneficiary
under the more liberal provisions of § 11(2)(c), then lhe accumulated total
deductions of the member shall be given to the surviving beneficiary chosen under
§ 11(2)(c). MAss. GEN. L. cb. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). If there is no other
surviving beneficiary, the spouse shall receive the member's accumulated total
deductions. Id. On a member's death, the board shall notify the spouse and
children of the member what information is necessary to determine their eligibility
for benefits. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(c) Option (d) (1992). Remarriage of the
spouse reduces the Member Survivor l\llowance. ld.
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form "one or more beneficiaries to receive" the return of the employee's
contributions if he or she dies before retirement, according to the
retirement statute's section 11(2).46 The statute contains several
exceptions to an employee's ability to nominate any person to receive his
or her contributions. For example, if the deceased employee has
nominated a beneficiary for part of the retirement allowance under the
more limited provisions of section 12(2) Option (d) (Member Survivor
Allowance),47 payment of the member's contributions to a beneficiary
under section 11(2) shall not be made. 48 Thus, a member cannot
"split" retirement benefits by giving contributions to a non-relative and
part of the pension to a relative. Another exception occurs when an em
ployee is survived by a dependent child and payment is not made under
the broad provisions of section 11(2)!9 Apart from these exceptions,
an adult member may nominate whoever be or she wishes to receive his
or her contributions upon death.
2. Dying After Retirement
A member who survives until the age of retirement and becomes
eligible for retirement can retire and choose from three different options
with respect to retirement benefits.50 Each option is tailored to
advance different goals ofdifferent employees, and together they present
a rather broad range of options for employees to choose from,
depending on their family situations and ·wishes. For an individual who
seeks to have the maximum amount ofincome during his or her life and
has no person to whom he or she seeks to leave any benefits, Option (a),
the "Life Annuity," is the obvious choice. It is a "full retirement
46. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). This subsection also contains the
proviso that "any such beneficiaries nominated by a minor shall be of his kindred."
Id. § 11(2)(c). See infra chart accompanying notes 66-75.
47. Id. § 12{2) Option (d). The list of possible beneficiaries for MAss. GEN. L.
ch. 32, § 12(2) Options (c) and (d) is actually contained in Option (c). See infra text
accompanying notes 124-32.
48. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). In such an instance, return of
contributions and interest would be made under the provisions of§ 12(2).
49. Id. Specifically, if the deceased employee is a male and is survived by a
person eligible to receive the pension allowance as set forth in § 12B (which provides
for an additional allowance for spouses and children of surviving members), or is a
female and is survived by a child eligible according to § 12B, the return of
contributions to the designated beneficiary shall not be made. MAss. GEN. L. ch.
32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). If "the widow" or guardian of the minor child chooses not to
elect to receive the benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled, the benefits
will be paid in accordance with the employee's choice. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32,
§ 11(2)(c) (1992).
50. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(1) (1992). If a member lives to retireme.nt and
dies without having chosen an option, the retirement allowance is paid as in § 12(2)
Option (b) (1992). MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(1) (1992). See infra notes 52-65 and
accompanying text. See also infra chart accompanying notes 66-75.
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allowance," including a pension, which does not provide payment to any
beneficiaries.51 All payments are made during the member's life and
terminate upon death.
Option (b), the "Cash Refund Annuity," involves a member receiving
a cash annuity consisting generally of employee contributions and a
pension.52 But if the employee dies before the annuity portion
disbursed equals the amount of contributions made, the beneficiary as
designated in the permissive provisions of section 11(2)5s receives the
balance of the member's contributions.54 If the employee dies after
having received annuity payments which are greater than the amount of
employee contributions, the beneficiary receives nothing.55 The benefi
ciary does not under any circumstances receive the pension.
The final choice, Option (c), is the "Joint and Last Survivor
Allowance." This option is designed for persons who want to provide
for a beneficiary as well as receive a retirement allowance. Under
Option (c), a member gets a reduced retirement allowance during his or
her lifetime.56 After the member's death, the eligible beneficiary
receives two-thirds of the member's retirement allowance for the
beneficiary's lifetime.57
This "Joint and Last Survivor Allowance" is a very valuable benefit,
but unlike the treatment of employee contributions made to the system,
the employee is only allowed to designate a beneficiary from certain
limited categories of people.58 Under this provision, as with the Mem
ber Survivor Allowance discussed above,59 "[n]o person shall be eligible
for nomination as beneficiary . . . unless such person is the spouse[,]
former spouse who has not remarried, child, father, mother, sister or

51. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (a) (1992). The life annuity is a full
retirement allowance payable to such member which shall consist-of a regular life
annuity, a pension, and an additional life annuity. Id.
52. MAss GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (1992).
53. See supra notes 42, 46-49 and accompanying text.
54. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (1992).
55. Id.
56. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992); PERA REPORT, supra note
9, at 23.
57. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option {c) {1992). Once the member reaches
retirement, the 12(c) beneficiary choice becomes irrevocable: if the beneficiary dies
on or after the date the retirement allowance becomes effective, but before the death
of the member, the member shall be paid a full retirement benefit under Option {a)
and may not designate anyone else to receive the benefit. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32,
§ 12(2) Option (c) (1992). If, however, the beneficiary dies before the date the retire
ment allowance becomes effective, the member may make a new election under
Option (a), (b), or (c). Id.
58. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 43-45.
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brother of such member."60 No person can be a member's Joint and
Last Survivor other than one who falls '\vithin the categories of the
spouse or immediate family. The Joint and Last Survivor Allowance is
the only means by which an employee may provide an annual allowance
for a named beneficiary. If an employee does not have a spouse, a
former spouse who has not remarried, or a relative on the authorized list
to whom he or she wants to bequeath these benefits, the employee must
take either the Life Annuity option,61 using the entire retirement bene
fit, or the Cash Refund Annuity,62 which allows an employee to give a
portion of his or her contributions to a designee outside the retirement
allowance beneficiary provisions of Option (c) if any contributions
remain at the time of death.ss All of the three options included in
section 12(2) are actuarially equivalent.64 This means that each is
designed to cost the public employer the same amount65

60. MAss. GEN. L. ch 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). If a spouse receiving an
allowance as a beneficiary dies leaving children of the deceased employee and the
beneficiary who are under eighteen years of age, the children's guardian will receive
the member's share. Id. This list is hereinafter referred to as the "retirement
allowance beneficiary" provisions.
61. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12{2) Option (a) (1992).
62. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (1992).
63. As allowed by MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2) {1992).
64. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12 (2) Option (c) (1992).
65. "Actuarial equivalent" is defined by the retirement statute as "any benefit of
equal value when computed upon the basis of che Combined Annuity Table of
Mortality set back one year and interest at the rate of three per cent [sic] per
annum." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992).
An additional definition of "actuarial equivalent" is, "[i]f the present value of two
series of payments is equal, taldng into account a given interest rate and mortality
according to a given table, the two series are said to be actuarially equivalent. For
example, under a given set of actuarial assumptions, a lifetime monthly benefit of
$67.60 beginning at age 60 can be said to be the actuarial equivalent of $100 a
month beginning at age 65. The actual benefit amounts are different but the present
value of the two benefits, considering mortality and interest. is che same."
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS 3 (June M. LelunanJ ed., 6th ed
1987).
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TABLE I

1. Death Occurs Before Retirement
Type of Funds:

Beneficiary Options:

A. Member's Own Contributions plus
interest66

Emplo-ree's
Choice67

B. Two-Thirds of total retirement
allowance to which member would have
been entitled if retirement had taken
place on date of death (Member-Survivor
Allowance)68

Spouse, former
spouse who has not
remarried, siblin~,
children, parents 9

2. Death Occurs After Retirement
Options:
(a) Life Annuity. Full pension plus
annuity, received by member during
lifetime70

None71

(b) Cash Refund Annuity. Cash annuity
including annuity plus pension for
member's lifetime; beneficiary receives
balance of employee's contributions if
employee dies before receiving annuity
pa~ents greater than her contribu
tions 72

Employee's choice78

(c) Joint and Last Survivor. Reduced
allowance during member's lifetime;
beneficiary receives two-thirds of the
member's retirement allowance during
her lifetime74

Spouse, former
spouse who has not
remarried, siblin~s,
children, parents 5

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.
MAss. GEN. L.

ch. 32,
ch. 32,
ch. 32,
cb. 32,
ch. 32,
cb. 32,
ch. 32,
ch. 32,
ch. 32,
cb. 32,

§ 11 (2)(a) (1992).
§ 11 (2)(c) (1992).
§ 12 (2) Option (d) (1992).
§ 12(2) Options (c), (d) (1992).
§ 12(2) Option (a) (1992).
§ 12(2) Option (a) (1992).
§ 12(2) Option (b) (1992).
§§ 12(2) Option (b), 11(2) (1992).
§ 12(2) Option (c) (1992).
§ 12(2) Option (c) (1992).
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The limitations on beneficiaries of the Joint and Last Survivor
Allowance and the Member Survivor Allowance in certain respects
deprive some deserving members of the right to control their benefits
as opposed to other members.76 Employees are only allowed to retire
after providing loyal service to the Commonwealth for many years.77
The retirement allowance, as well as the opportunity to name those
closest to one as beneficiaries, are intended to constitute part of the
reward for such loyal service.
For example, if an unmarried, long-divorced, or never-married
member has no living children, parents, or siblings, but does have an
extremely close friend for whom he or she wishes to provide, under the
present system the member is not permitted to name the friend as
beneficiary of either the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance78 or the
Member Survivor Allowance.79 The member may provide for a return
of contributions to the friend if the employee dies before retirement.80
If the employee lives to retirement, he or she must choose between the
Life Annuity Option81 and the Cash Refund Annuity.82 The Cash
Refund Annuity allows for the return of a portion of the employee's
contributions to the friend/beneficiary, depending on how long the
member lives. If a member has a close friend and a living brother,
however, the member is unable both to bequeath the contributions to
the friend and name the brother as beneficiary of the Joint and Last
Survivor Allowance. If the brother is named as the Joint and Last
Survivor83 or Member Survivor84 beneficiary, the close friend cannot

76. The public retirement statute of the other New England states contain fewer
limitations on who an employee may choose to be a beneficiary of a · retirement
allowance than Massachusetts. In fact, Vennont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and
Maine have no limitations on whom an employee may designate for receipt of an
allowance. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 468 Options 2, 3, 4 (1985); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 5-165 {a)(2), (3) (West 1988); N.H. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 100-A:13 Options 2, 3 .
(1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17953(2) (West 1989). Rhode Island only
requires that a recipient of a retirement allowance have an insurable interest in the
employee's life. R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-10-18 (a), (b) (1990).
77. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 5 (1992). Twenty years of creditable service is
generally required before retirement is achieved. Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at 314
(citing MAss. GE.N. L. ch. 32, § 5 {1992)). See supra text accompanying note 25.
78. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992).
79. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992).
80. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 11(2) (1992).
81. MAss. GE.N. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (a) (1992).
82. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option {b) (1992).
83. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) OptiQn (c) (1992).
84. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992).
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be named to receive the return ofemployee contributions under section
11(2).85
Another example is that of two unmarried individuals in a heterosex
ual relationship who consider themselves to be spouses, live together,
share their incomes, and name each other as beneficiaries in their wills.
In such a scenario, the female member could not name her "spouse" as
beneficiary of the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance or the Member
Survivor Allowance. If she dies before retirement, the only way her
partner can receive any of her benefits or contributions only is if she had
named him under section 11(2) as beneficiary of her contributions. If
she dies after retirement, the only way he can receive any of her benefits
or contributions is if she had chosen the Cash Refund Annuity and dies
prior to receiving an amount equal to the contributions she had made
to the system. If the member dies before retirement, the "spouse" could
not possibly elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, because
non-spouses are not permitted to make such elections.86
If the heterosexual couple married, the member would instantly be
able to name her husband as Joint and Last Survivor and Member
Survivor beneficiary.87 If she dies before retirement and had neglected
to name her husband or any other person as beneficiary, her husband
could elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, assuming that the
couple had been married a year and was living together at the time of
her death.88
An additional example is of two individuals in a homosexual
relationship, who consider themselves to be spouses, live together, share
support of each other, name each other as beneficiaries in their wills,
and whose relationship shares many of the characteristics of a traditional
marriage. A member of the retirement system in such a situation would
have no way of providing for his or her partner with the Member
Survivor Allowance or theJoint and Last Survivor Allowance, even if the
partner was completely dependent on the member for financial support.89

85. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992).
86. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992).
87. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(c) (1992).
88. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992). Also, the employee must have been
a member for at least two years. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 124-32.
89. It is illegal in Massachusetts for an employer, "because of the ... sexual
orientation . . . of any individual . . . to discriminate against such individual in
compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 4(1) (1992).
Chapter 151B, section (4)(1) of the Massachusetts General Laws does not outlaw
discrimination on the basis of marital status. It may be argued that the limitations
in the retirement allowance beneficiary provisions effectively offer lower compensa
tion and less favorable terms, conditions, and privileges of employment to gay and
lesbian employees than to heterosexual employees. A heterosexual employee can
marry her partner and thus may name his or her spouse (or former spouse) as a
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retirement allowance beneficiary. By contrast, a gay or lesbian employee cannot
marry his or her partner and is thus unable to provide the same benefits to the
partner (or former partner).
Participation in the system is mandatory for employees. An employee cannot set
up an individual retirement account (for which he or she could choose any
beneficiary) during any year when he or she is a member. I.RC. § 219(g) (1988).
Thus, an employee's mandatory participation in the system affects retirement
planning in a significant manner.
The success of a discrimination claim is uncertain but possible. First, an ame
ndment to several sections of Chapter 151B states: "[N]othing in this act shall be
construed so as to legitimize or validate a 'homosexual marriage,• so-called, or to
provide health insurance or related employee benefits to a 'homosexual spouse,' so
called" 1989 Mass. Acts. ch. 516, § 19. This language has not been construed in any
reported decisions.
One issue in a discrimination case is likely to be whether a retirement allowance
is an "employee benefit" which is "related" to "health insurance." Chapter 151B by
its terms is to be construed liberally to accomplish its purposes, which include
opposing clisaimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employmenL MAsS.
GEN. L ch. 151B, § 9 (1992). The retirement statute operates largely independently
of any provisions relating to state employees' health insurance. See supra note 32.
Moreover, many employers provide health insurance benefits that do not provide
retirement benefits. (For private employers, health insurance costs comprise 7.2%
of total compensation, while retirement costs comprise 2.9% of total compensation).
See EMPLOYMENT COST INDEXFS AND LEvELs, supra note 12, at 11. Retirement
benefits clearly serve clifferent purposes from health insurance benefits, as retirement
benefits are aimed at providing income to retired employees and their dependents,
while health insurance benefits are aimed at protecting employees from unexpected
financial loss caused by injury or illness to their families or themselves. Employee
Benefits Handbook, supra note 11, at 1-2, 1-6, 33-5. Thus, a retirement allowance
may be considered a benefit which is not related to health insurance.
Even apart from the amendment discussed above, are the retirement allowance
beneficiary provisions discriminatory in violation of Chapter 151B? The logic of
Massachusetts Governor Weld's Executive Order 340 (discussed infra at text
accompanying note 134) compels an affinnative answer. The Executive Order
acknowledges the Commonwealth's obligations under Chapter 151B "to protect its
citizens from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation," and directs the
personnel department to promulgate such regulations "as are necessary to eliminate
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the benefits provided to
employees under its jurisdiction." Executive Order 340, infra note 134. The Order
goes on to provide a narrow list of benefits which are being extended, such as
bereavement leave for an employee whose domestic partner or domestic partner's
family member has died. If it is discriminatory to not allow an employee to take
bereavement leave when his or her domestic partner dies, it is also discriminatory to
not allow an employee to provide a retirement allowance to his or her domestic part
ner when the employee dies.
Some legal support may be found for arguing that the retirement allowance
beneficiary scheme is discriminatory, although such arguments have not gained broad
approval. The Vermont Labor Relations Board in June 1993 ruled against the
University of Vermont that the university violated its non-discrimination policies
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, by denying medical
benefits to domestic partners of employe.es while extending benefits to spouses of
employees. Grievance of: B.M., S.S., C.M., andJ.R., No. 92-30, at 214 (Vermont
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The beneficiary provisions applicable to the Joint and Last Survivor
Allowance and the Member Survivor Allowance were amended in 1991
to permit a member to designate a "former spouse who has not
remarried" as a beneficiary.90 This addition apparently was made in
order to make it more practical to divide pensions in the context of
domestic relations orders in divorce actions.91 This addition is
significant because it expands the retirement allowance beneficiary
provisions to include persons not related to members by blood or by
marriage. It does not limit beneficiary choices to those aimed at
supporting "traditional" families, i.e., a "former spouse" by definition is
generally not part of the family unit (or he or she would not be a former
spouse). It is also at odds with the provisions concerning the spouse of
a member electing to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, which
state that the allowance may be denied if the parties were not living
together at the time of the member's death.92
It may be argued that the limited beneficiary choices of thejoint and
Last Survivor Allowance and the Member Survivor Allowance are
appropriate because limiting the choices to relatives by blood and
marriage (except for former spouses) allows the benefits to be targeted
at dependents of employee-members. Indeed, it is an overriding goal of
the retirement system to provide for the dependents of employee-mem-

Labor Relations Bd. 1993). The Vermont Labor Relations Board applied a disparate
impact analysis based on Griggs v. Duke Power Co.• 401 U.S. 424, 4.31 (1971), stating
that "[o]nce the employee demonstrates that the employer['s] practice causes a
disparate impact on a protected class, the practice is prohibited unless the employer
can demonstrate that the practice is related to job performance and [is] consistent
with business necessity." Id. at 216. The Board found that excluding unmarried
domestic partners of employees from health benefits had a "markedly disproportion
ate impact on gay and lesbian employees compared.to heterosexual employees." Id.
at 218. Finding no business necessity, the Board ordered the University to provide
domestic partner benefits. Id. at 220-21. A similar disparate impact analysis was
used in Anglin v. City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Library Bd., No. 88180 EM-12
(City of Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights 1992), to find that the city's failure to
provide health benefits to same-sex partners of employees violated the city's ordi
nance forbidding discrimination on the basis ofaffectional preference. Id. at 13. But
see Phillips v. WISconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. 1991) (state's
failure to provide health insurance benefits to partner of lesbian employee held not
discriminatory on basis of sexual orientation or gender and not equal protection
violation). Disparate impact analysis may be a promising approach to pursue in legal
challenges to the retirement allowance beneficiary provisions.
90. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12{2) Option (c) (1992).
91. See Memorandum from John J . McGlynn, Commissioner of Division of
Employee Retirement Administration, to All Retirement Boards (Apr. 24, 1991) (on
file with author).
·
92. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). See infra text accompanying
notes 124-32.
·
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bers.9' Upon close examination, however, it becomes clear that the
retirement allowance beneficiary list is not about providing for
dependents. A member could leave his or her pension to an adult
millionaire sister, for example. Using a blood relationship as a surrogate
for dependency determinations is not even rational.94
Moreover, although members may have actual dependents who do
not fall within the allowed class, there is no latitude for case-by-case
determinations in thls context. Indeed, the statutory list seems to be
based on a concept of family that statistics show is becoming less and
less common.95 Often, in today's two-earner households, relationships
between adults are of interdependence, and not of one-way depen
dence.96 If the goal of the retirement system is to promote caring for
actual dependents, perhaps the retirement allowance beneficiary list
should be changed by allowing the Board the discretion to determine
whether a person with whom a member has a relationship is truly
financially dependent.97
The retirement allowance beneficiary restrictions may be defended
as a bright-line means of reflecting the emotional attachments of the
m~ority of members, and allows those members to provide for those to
whom they are emotionally attached. Yet, the list may not accurately
reflect the relationships of many members at all. Some people are
estranged from their legally-recognized families and it would be highly
unlikely that they would wish to provide a benefit to those families. If
the goal is to allow members to designate as a beneficiary a person to
whom they are emotionally attached, regardless of dependence, the list
should be revised to permit the designation of persons beyond those
currently listed.
It may also be argued that the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance,98
which allows a member to provide to a beneficiary an allowance during
the beneficiary's lifetime, is more expensive for the Commonwealth and
should therefore be more limited than other options. This analysis is
inaccurate, however, because the three options contained in section
12(2)99 are actuarially e~ent, 100 or designed to cost the public
employer the same amount. 101 For example, the amount received by

93. See supra note 11 and a~companying text, and infra text accompanying note
117.
94. See infra note 112.
95. See supra notes 1 and 4.
96. BERGMANN, supra note 1, at 25-38.
97. See infra note 122.
98. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992).
99. The Life Annuity Option. the Cash Refund Annuity Option, and the Joint
and Last Survivor Allowance Option.
100. MAss. Gl!'.N. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992).
101. See supra note 65.
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the employee and her beneficiary under the Joint and Last Survivor
Allowance is adjusted according to the age of the employee and the age
of the beneficiary to be actuarially equivalent to the Life Annuity
option. 102 Thus, there appears to be no fiscal justification for the
beneficiary limitations on the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance.
Next, it may be argued that the Commonwealth has an interest in
promoting "traditional" nuclear families because such units are deemed
the best setting in which to raise children.103 Even assuming this
conclusion is correct, 104 the retirement allowance beneficiary list does
not promote such families, since it includes adult siblings, ex-spouses,
and parents who may not be involved in any way with the member's
household unit or with child-rearing.
The retirement statute arguably treats members who have responsibil
ities and personal lives that do not fit within the statute and who wish to
designate beneficiaries to reflect their responsibilities and lives, in a
similar fashion to those who have been convicted of a "criminal offense
involvi~g violation of the laws applicable to [their] office or posi
tion."105 Employees convicted of such offenses can designate that
return of contributions be made to a beneficiary of their choice, but
forfeit any interest otherwise received. 106 Such employees also forfeit
their retirement allowance. 107 Loyal employees, who have not been
convicted of any offc:nse, and who wish to provide benefits to someone
outside the rigid beneficiary list can only designate return of their own

102. Thus, while a member may designate a very young beneficiary to receive the
Joint and Last Survivor Allowance, the annual amount received by the beneficiary will
be less than that which would be received by an older beneficiary. MAss. GEN. L.
ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992).
103. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently held in the context of
adoption, that the "best interests of the child,. is the governing principle and that
adoption by a lesbian co-parent of her partner's child is appropriate if in the best
interests of the child. Adoption ofSusan, 416 Mass. 1003,1003, 619 N.E.2d 323,324
(1993); Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 210.17, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318-21 (1993).
104. Interestingly, the City of Boston's Executive Order entitled "Extension of
Certain Personnel Benefits,.. February 12, 1993, indicates that the City has an interest
in promoting bonds within all types of families. It states: "The City recognizes that
the welfare of all residents is enhanced by efforts to reinforce the bonds of families,
both traditional and non-traditional, and encourages individuals to provide
emotional, economic, and social support within households[.]" See infra text
accompanying notes 135-36.
105. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 12(2)(c), {d), 15(4) {1992).
106. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 15 (4) (1992).
107. Id. The statute does not define offenses pertaining to an employee's office.
A prominent current case pertaining to this issue is MacLean v. State Bd. of
Retirement, No. 93-33cv1203 (D. Mass. filed Oct. 12, 1993), in which former
Massachusetts state representative William Q. MacLean is challenging the Retirement
Board's decision terminating his retirement allowance because of his conviction on
conflict of interest charges.
·
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contributions, plus interest, to a beneficiary.108 They cannot provide
any of their retirement allowance to a person not listed in the statute.
The primary difference is that the loyal employee is permitted to direct
his or her other contributions plus interest to the recipient of his or her
choosing, while the convicted employee is allowed to designate the
recipient of his or her contributions only (without interest).
Further, it is incongruous that a member may designate a former
spouse to receive theJoint and Last Survivor's Allowance, while a gay or
lesbian member in an intact, flourishing, long-term relationship cannot
designate his or her partner to receive the allowance. Tills outcome
contravenes principles of individual consideration of circumstances
found elsewhere in the statute.109
The limitations on choice of beneficiary also force those with
responsibilities and personal lives that do not conform to the statute's
structure to deny those connections, e.g., to take the full annuity
allowance,110 or to provide minimal or no support to their loved
one. 111 The employee in a lifelong, but legally unrecognized, relation
ship is denied the opportunity to take a lesser allowance during his or
her lifetime in order to provide the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance
to a partner.112 In sum, the retirement allowance beneficiary pro
visions make very little, if any sense. They do not save the Common
wealth money. They do not further any coherent goal. Their restric

108. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2) (1992). Note that this only applies if any
employee dies before retirement; if he dies after retirement, the designated survivor
only receives the remainder of the member's contributions, if any. MAss. GEN. L.
ch. 32, § 12(2} Option (b) (1992).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 116-32.
110. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2} Option (a) (Ufe Annuity) (1992). See supra text
accompanying note 51.
111. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (Cash Refund Annuity) (1992). See
supra text accompanying notes 52-55, 62-63.
112. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). The retirement allowance
beneficiary provisions. as discussed above. limit gay and lesbian employees' rights to
provide for their partners or former partners while allowing married and divorced
heterosexual employees to provide for their spouses or former spouses. Challenges
under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and under Part
I, article 10 of the Massachusetts Constitution are worth considering. Most courts
have applied rational basis scrutiny to equal protection claims of lesbians and gay
men. Patricia A. Cain, LitigatingfM Lesbian and Gay Rights. 79 VA. L. REv. 1551,
1620 n.368 (1993). As the discussion supra at text accompanying notes 60-112 haS
shown, the p rovisions are not reasonably tailored to any legitimate goal. They are
not aimed at supporting members' family units (former spouses can be designated,
see supra text accompanying notes 90-92), they are not aimed at supporting
dependents of members (non-dependent parents and siblings can be designated, see
supra text accompanying notes 93-95), other persons who may be actual dependents
cannot be designated (see supra text accompanying notes 95-97), and its limitations
do not save the state any funds (see supra text accompanying notes 98-102).

1010

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:991

tions prevent employees from providing for actual dependents and loved
ones after their own deaths.
IV.

STATIITORY DEFINITIONS OF DESERVING SPOUSES

In several portions of the retirement statute, discussed in this part,
the marital status of a retirement system member is a critical factor in
determining whether a surviving spouse is entitled to benefits, but it is
not the sole determinant. Several sections provide that the surviving
spouse of a deceased member may not be able to receive benefits if the
spouse did not live with the member at the time of the member's death,
remarries, or if "the Board finds that the spouse engaged in certain
reprehensible conduct. ns The duration, nature, and state of the
relationship at the time of the member's death is in some circumstances
taken into account. 114 Given that the statute considers the substance
of the marital relationship in determining whether a surviving spouse
receives certain benefits, it is inconsistent to deny all benefits to the
surviving partners of gay, lesbian, or unmarried heterosexual members
without considering the duration, nature, and state of their relation
ships.115
Accidental Death Benefit
The retirement statute provides for an accidental death benefit,
which is neither a pension nor annuity benefit, for any member who dies
as the result of a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone while
in the performance of official duties. 116 This payment is made
automatically according to the recipient scheme set forth in the statute;
members do not designate beneficiaries in this context. The theme of
providing for employees' dependents is most emphasized in the
provisions pertaining to accidental death benefits. 117
The statute directs death benefits to be paid to a surviving spouse for
as long as the spouse survives and does not remarry. To be eligible
A.

113. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 9 (2)(a), (b), 12(2) Option (d) (1992). See infra text
accompanying notes 116-132.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 116-32.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 60-112, and infra text accompanying notes
116-32.
116. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(1), (2)(a) (1992).
117. See supra text accompanying note 11, and supra text accompanying note 93.
lbis is true in other New England states' retirement laws, where accidental death
benefits generally go automatically to a surviving spouse, children, and other
relatives. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws§ 36-10-20 {1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 100-A:S
(1990); ME. .REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 18003 (West 1989). Vermont's public
retirement statutes provision on accidental death benefits states it shall be paid to the
"dependent beneficiary" or "dependent spouse" of the member, but it does not
define the term "dependent." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 465 (a), (b) (1985).
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under this provision, however, the couple must have been living
together118 at the time of the member's death for the surviving spouse
to receive the allowance.119 Alternatively, the spouse may receive the
benefit if the Board finds that the couple had been living apart at the
time of the member's death because of the member's desertion of such
spouse.120 Given these beneficiary provisions, it is puzzling that the
statute forces a benefit to be paid to a surviving spouse who the member
abandoned, since the member would presumably not want the survivor
to receive any benefits.121 The benefit also terminates upon remarriage
and is thus based on the assumption that marriage involves support and
that a remarried spouse no longer needs or deserves such support.122
If the couple was living apart at the time of the member's death because
the spouse had abandoned the member, presumably the spouse would

118. For discussion of what constitutes "living together" for purposes of Mas
sachusetts General Law Chapter 32, § 12{2)(d), see Donnelly v. Contributory
Retirement Appeals Bd., 15 Mass. App. CL 19, 443 N .E.2d 416 (1982), discussed infra
note 126.
119. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(2)(a), (b) (1992).
120. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(2)(a) (1992).
121. This illustrates the dominance of the concept of dependence in this section
of the statute. For, even if the member had deserted the spouse because the spouse
was engaging in moral turpitude, or for some other "justifiable cause," the accidental
death benefits are paid to the spouse. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d),
and infra text accompanying notes 112-13 (1992). The statute assumes the spouse
is dependent on the member and therefore worthy of supporL
122. Underscoring the equation of marriage with support is the provision
pertaining to disposition of the benefits if there is no eligible swviving spouse. In
such instances, the benefit is paid to a guardian for the benefit of any children who
are under eighteen years ofage and unmarried or who were over eighteen and inca
pacitated from earning on the date of the member's death. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32,
§ 9(2)(b) (1992). It should be noted that permission of the probate court and the
parent or guardian of a minor wishing to marry is necessary before a minor is
permitted to marry. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 207 §§ 25, 33 (1992). Section 9(b) means
that if a surviving child under eighteen marries, the benefit terminates. Once a child
is over eighteen, the benefit terminates whether the individual is married or not.
The benefit provisions continue for a variety of situations. If there is no eligible
surviving spouse or child, it shall be paid to the:
surviving totally dependent father or mother of such member...then to any
totally dependent unmarried or widowed sister ofsuch member with whom
he was living at the time of his death, so long as such beneficiary or
beneficiaries survive, do not marry or remarry, and are unable to support
themselves.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(c) (1992).
The board is to decide all questions relating to dependency. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32,
§ 9(3)(a) (1992). While the provision does not even contemplate the possibility that
a brother could be totally dependent, the statute has been construed to allow benefits
to a totally dependent brother. Flanagan v. Dedham Retirement Board, Division of
Administrative Law Appeals, No. 8995 (Mar. 13, 1986) (on flle with author).
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not receive the benefit.w The accidental death benefits provisions are
an example of marriage used as a necessary but not sufficient condition
for payment of benefits to the surviving spouse of an employee. as
various conditions must be satisfied before payment is made.

Member Survivor Allowance
The "Member Survivor Allowance," previously discussed, 124 allows
the surviving spouse of a member who dies before retirement to elect to
receive a survivor's share amounting to two-thirds of the member's re
tirement allowance if the member had not designated a beneficiary other
than the spouse. 125 · To receive this allowance, however, the spouse
must have been married to the member for more than a year and the
couple must have been living together at the time of death. 126 If they
were living apart, the Board must find that they were living apart for
"justifiable cause other than desertion or moral turpitude on the part of
the [surviving] spouse" in order to award these benefits.127
This provision also illustrates the use of marriage as an important,
but not exclusive, factor in the allocation of benefits. The one-year rule

B.

123. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(2)(a) (1992).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 4345; supra chart accompanying
notes 66-75.
125. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). Section 12(B) also provides
for an allowance where a member who has two years creditable service under the
circumstances in which a surviving spouse can elect to receive a survivors' allowance,
see supra note 40 and infra text accompanying notes 126-32, and an additional
allowance is paid to the surviving spouse for the benefit of the children. MAss. GEN.
L . ch. 32, § 12B (1992). The couple must have been living together at the time of
death, and if living apart the cause must not be moral turpitude of the surviving
spouse. Id.
126. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d), 12B (1992). See Donnelly v.
Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 15 Mass. App. CL 19, 443 N.E.2d 416 (1982).
In DonneUy, the Appeals Court held that a husband and wife were "living together"
at the time of the member-wife's death, so that the husband was entitled to claim the
allowance. overturning the Board's determination that they had not been "living
together" under the statute, and overriding the wife's choice of her children as
named beneficiaries of her contributions. Id. at 24, 443 N .E.2d at 419. At the time
of the member-wife's death by suicide, the husband was out of town on a short trip,
and the wife had begun moving out of the house but was prevented from doing so
completely by a storm. Id. at 21, 443 N.E.2d at 417. Where the parties had not
established separate residences, the court held that they were living together at the
time of the wife's death. Id. at 21-24, 443 N.E.2d at 417-19. The consequence was
that the children were denied the return of their mother's contribution and the
husband received the Member Survivor Allowance. Id. at 19, 443 N.E.2d at 419.
127. MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992). See infra notes 128-31. The emphasis
on desertion is interesting in view of the concomitant emphasis elsewhere in the
statute on dependence. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(a) (Accidental Death Benefits)
(1992). See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. Moral turpitude, however, seems
not to be related to dependence. See infra text accompanying notes 128-30.
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forbidding the spouse from electing to receive benefits if the parties
were manied less than a year ensures that a couple will not marry at the
last minute before a member dies so that benefits can be passed on to
a "sham" spouse.
Moreover, if the parties bad been married for twenty years but were
living apart at the time ofdeath, the surviving spouse will not necessarily
receive the allowance. In such circumstances, the survivor does not
automatically receive the allowance, but can only receive it if the Board
finds that, although they were living apart, the survivor did not desert
the member or engage in moral turpitude, 128 and the separation was
justifiable.129 This seems to have the purpose of insuring that a non
deserving spouse, e.g., a spouse who had deserted the innocent member,
should not receive the benefit. Similarly, where a separation was
precipitated by the survivor's moral t;:r:Ritude, the survivor should not
be able to elect to receive the benefit. so Only if a separation is for
'justifiable cause," as determined by the Board, 151 can a surviving
spouse manied to a deceased member for more than one year elect to
receive the benefit. The statute thus "weeds out" the undeserving
surviving spouse, rather than making the bright-line legal issue of
marria~e the only factor relevant in being able to elect to receive the
share.1

128. There is no dear definition of "moral turpitude" under MassachUsetts law.
In Essex County Retirement Bd.. v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 342 Mass.
322, 324, 173 N.E.2d 627, 629 (1961}, the court assumed that bribery and larceny
constituted moral turpitude. The term has interesting connotations: In Nemetz v.
INS, 485 F. Supp. 470 (E.D.Va. 1980), a district court found that an immigrant's
involvement in a long·tenn homosexual relationship constituted moral turpitude and
demonstrated the immigrant's bad moral character so as to mandate his exclusion.
This finding was reversed on appeal. Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981).
The phrase recurs in the context of whether a surviving spouse can elect to receive
a survivor's allowance; if the spouses are living apart because of moral turpitude on
the part of the survivor, the survivor cannot receive the allowance. MAss. GEN. L
ch. 32, §§ 12(2) Option (d), 12B (1992).
129. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12 Option (d) (1992).
130. The "moral turpitude" phrase is repeated in MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 10. See
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131. According to the Dtmnelly Court, "justifiable cause" is a "tenn of art" in
domestic relations law. Donnelly v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 15 Mass.
App. Ct. 19, 22, 443 N.E.2d 416, 418 (1982).
132. This "weeding out" is similar to, although broader than, the spouse's forced
share in the context of wills, where a court may make a determination, prior to the
death of the decedent, that will prohibit a spouse from claiming a forced share. See
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 191, § 15 (1992} & MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209, § 36 (1992) (providing
that a probate court may enter a judgment that a person has been deserted by his
or her spouse or is living apart from such person's spouse for justifiable cause, and
in such an instance the surviving spouse may not claim a forced share).

1014

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

V.

PROPOSAlS FOR

[Vol. 28:991

CHANGE

A. Introduction
This article has described the rigid statutory limitations on retirement
allowance beneficiaries and discussed several scenarios in which such
limitations may deny deserving members the opportunity to designate as
beneficiaries those to whom they are responsible and emotionally
attached. This article has also contrasted the rigid rules pertaining to
designating beneficiaries with other provisions of the retirement statute.
These other provisions, such as accidental death benefits, embody the
ideas that rigid categories such as marital status should not be the sole
criterion on which to base entitlement to retirement benefits and that
other factors, such as emotional and financial dependence and the
nature of the subject relationship, should be important in certain
contexts. Similarly, entitlement to a portion ofan employee's retirement
allowance should not tum. solely on marital status, which can deny loyal
employees opportunities they have earned. Rather, the statute should
be revised to more fairly and accurately reflect the realities of the diverse
families of public employees.
This article will now propose several simple changes in the statute
which would make it more consistent and fair to all employees. The
changes proposed will not significantly increase costs or administrative
burdens on the Commonwealth.

B. Specific Proposals
1. Allowing a Member to Designate His or Her Domestic Partner as

a Recipient of the Joint and Last Survivor and Member Survivor
Allowance
The beneficiary provisions for the Joint and Last Survivor and
Member Survivor Allowances beneficiary list should be amended to
reflect the values of both supporting dependents of members and
enabling members to provide support for those to whom they are
emotionally attached. 133 To accomplish this goal, each member should

133. One possibility for change would be to eliminate the limitations of sections
12 Option (c) and 12 Option (d) on designation of beneficiaries for survivor
allowances. This would allow a member to designate anyone as a beneficiary. As
discussed in notes 14 and 76 above, the other New England states do not contain
comparable limitations onbeneficiaries, and employees can designate whomever they
wish to re{;eive retirement benefits afrer their deaths. Sin~ the various options are
acwarially equivalent. it can be argued that it should not matter at all who {;3D be
beneficiaries. The administrative simplicity of eliminating limitations on who can
receive the Option (c) allowance is very appealing. However, such an amendment
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have the option ofdesignating a "domestic partner" to receive his or her
survivor's benefits.
Both public and private employers are increasingly providing some
of the same employment benefits to "domestic partners" of employees
that they provide to legal spouses. Massachusetts Governor William
Weld, in a 1992 Executive Order, extended the benefits ofbereavement
and sick leave for state employees in a "relationship of mutual support"
with another person so that an employee whose domestic partner had
died could take off time from work. 1M In 1993, former City of Boston

would not reduce the inequities regarding the Member Survivor Allowance or
Accidental Death Allowance, and a domestic partner requirement could do so.
134. Exec. Order No. 340, reprinted in Report to Governor, Governor Weld's
Executive Order 340, entitled "Providing for Non-Discriminatory Benefit Policies for
Employees of the Commonwealth," provides as follows:
Whereas, Chapter 151B of the Massachusetts General Law established the
obligation of the Commonwealth to protect its citizens from discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation; and Whereas, the Commonwealth
recognizes its responsibility to take measures to ensure that its official
employment policies are in hannony with the established obligations of
Chapter 151B; Now, Therefore, I .. . do hereby order as follows:
1. For purposes of this executive order, "relationship ofmutual
support" means a relationship between two individuals, each
unmarried and competent to contract, characterized by mutual
caring and emotional support; an agreement to share basic living
expenses; a sharing of living quarters and an intent to do so
indefinitely; a mutual assumption ofresponsibility for each other's
welfare; and a mutual expectation that the relationship is exclusive
and will endure over time.
2. The Department of Personnel Administration shall, no later
than November 1, 1992, promulgate such regulations and policies
as are necessary to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in the benefits provided to employees under its
· jurisdiction. Benefits shall include the following:
a. An employee of the Commonwealth shall be
entitled to a maximum of four calendar days of paid
"bereavement" leave, upon the death ofa family member
or of a person with whom the employee has a relation
ship of mutual support.
b. An employee of the Commonwealth shall be
allowed to use up to 10 days of accrued sick leave in the
event of the serious illness of a family member or of a
person with whom the employee has a relationship of
mutual support.
3. An employee of the Commonwealth claiming leave benefits
on account of the illness or death of a person with whom the
employee has a relationship of mutual support must, as a
condition of receiving such leave benefits, certify to the Depart
ment of Personnel Administration the existence of his or her rela
tionship of mutual support .
Id.
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Mayor Raymond Flynn extended certain personnel benefits to "domestic
partners and other household members" of city of Boston employ
ees.185 The cities of Cambridge and Brookline have each passed
domestic partnership ordinances within the last year. 136 Also within
the last year, Clark University, Harvard University, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and Wellesley College have all put in place
domestic partnership policies that provide a range of benefits to
domestic partners of employees. 187
Numerous entities, including a federal agency {the Department of
Housing and Urban Development), 188 various municipalities,139 one
state \Dlinois), 140 and many private companies, including Levi
Strauss 41 and Lotus Development, 142 have instituted some types of

135. Boston Mayor Raymond L Flynn, Executive Order, Extension of Certain
Personnel Benefits (Feb. 12, 1993). The executive order did not define "domestic
partners", but included "domestic partners" in the definition of "household
members." Id. 1I 1. "Household members" was defined simply as persons who
currently reside in the household of a city employee and have shared their principal
domicile for not less than the past year with a City employee. Id. The order extend
ed sick, bereavement and family leave to household members of city employees and
directed certain city agencies to explore appropriate family and medical leave policies
to address all provisions of the executive order.
136. Christopher Mutler, Brookline AdoptsDomestic Partners Proposal, BAY WINDOWS,
June 10, 1993, at 1; CAMBRIDGE, MAss., MUN. CODE ch. 2, § 119 (1992); Town of
Brookline, Final Vote to Amend the Town ByLaws (June 2, 1993) (on file with
author).
137. Clark University, Proposed Policy for Extension of Benefits to Domestic
Partners not Legally Allowed to Marry under Massachusetts Law (Apr. 1993) (on file
with author); Memorandum fromJoan F. ruce, Director ofPersonnel, Massachusetts
Institute ofTechnology, to Members of the MIT Community (Apr. 28, 1993) (on file
With author); Memorandum from Molly Ambrose Ostwald, Director of Personnel,
Wellesley College, to Members of the Wellesley College Faculty and Staff (June 7,
1993) (on file with author). See Jordanna Hart, Benefits at Harvard to cover gay
partners, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1993, at 17.
138. Legisl4tive & Political Updates, LEsBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Apr. 1993, a t 26
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development puts into effect a domestic
partner family leave program).
139. See, e.g., Legisl4tive Updates, LEsBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Nov. 1992, at 79
(Sacramento adopts domestic partner registration ordinance); LEsBIAN/GAY LAw
NOTES, june 1993, at 63 (Minneapolis}. See infra note 143.
140. Legisl4tive Updates, LEsBIAN/GAY LAw Non:s, Nov. 1991, at 49 ("Dlinois
Senate has passed a bill allmving hospital patients to designate whom they won't
allow to visit them, a sort of mini-domestic partner bill.").
141. Leui Strauss, Princeton, Join Dtmu!Stic Partnership R.anks, LEsBIAN/ GAY LAw
NOTES, Apr. 1992, at 29.
142. Domestic Partnership Cause Advancer, WBIAN/GAY LAw Non:s, Oct. 1991, at
67 {Lotus will offer health and .other benefit coverage to domestic partners of gay
employees).
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domestic partnership benefit policies. 14! While it does not appear that
domestic partnership principles have yet been applied to any retirement
systems, it is unclear whether such a proposal has been made.144
Massachusetts thus has an opportunity to be a national leader in this
area.
Governor Weld's Executive Order 340 defines a "relationship of
mutual support" in a manner that could be applied in other contexts
with slight modifications. The order defines a "relationship of mutual
support" as, "[a] a relationship between two individuals. [b) each
unmarried and competent to contract; [c) characterized by mutual caring
and emotional support; [d] an agreement to share basic living expenses;
[e] a sharing of living quarters and an intent to do so indefinitely; [f] a
mutual assumption of responsibility for each other's welfare; and [g) a
mutual ~ectation that the relationship is exclusive and will endure over
time. " 145 The existing policy is administered by the Department of
Personnel Administration, which has prepared a form entitled "Certifica
tion of Relationship of Mutual Support" which repeats the above
definition and leaves blanks for the employee to verify that he or she is
"committed to a relationship of mutual support under the terms ofExec
utive Order 340. "146
The retirement statute should be amended to provide for members
to designate a "domestic partner" or "person with whom said member
is in a relationship of mutual support" to receive benefits under the

143. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake Cornish, A More Perfta Union: A Legal and
Social Ana0'sis' ofDomestic Partner Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164 (1992); Elbin,

supra note 5, at 1068.

In Berkeley, California, believed to be the first city to extend
health plan benefits to domestic partners, unmarried couples must file an Affidavit
of Domestic Partnership stating that they have lived together for at least six months
and "share common necessities of life... Id. at 1072. In Santa Cruz, California, which
also ·extends health benefits ·to domestic partners, the policy states that if the
employer or company suffers any loss because of a false statement in an Affidavit of
Domestic Parmership, the employer or company may sue for their losses. including
attorneys fees. ld. at 1073. The Santa Cruz policy also provides that the persons
must be at least eighteen and not related close by blood than would prevent them
from marrying in California. Id. Some private employers' domestic parmership
policies, e.g., that of Lotus Development, have applied only to gay and lesbian
employees, based on the reasoning that heterosexual employees can get married and
take advantage of spousal benefits while gay or lesbian employees cannot. All
governmental domestic partnership policies ofwhich this writer is aware, apply to all
employees regardless of sexual orientation.
144. In researching this article, the author bas found no published articles pertain
ing to this issue.
145. Exec. Order No. 340, supra note 134, 1 1.
146. Memorandum from Robert C. Dumont, Personnel Administrator to Cabinet
Secretaries and Agency Heads. Oct. 30, 1992 (on file with author). The form is
identified as confidential. It does not name the person with whom the employee is
in a Relationship of Mutual Support. See id.
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Member Survivor Allowance if the employee dies before retirement, 147
and the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance if the employee dies after
retirement. 148 The operable requirements could contain the elements
in Governor Weld's definition: (1) the member must be unmarried and
in a relationship with an individual who is unmarried; (2) the member
and the person with whom he is in a relationship must be competent to
contract; (3) the relationship must be characterized by mutual caring and
emotional support; (4) the persons in the relationship must have agreed
to share basic living expenses; (5) the persons in the relationship must
be living together and intend to do so indefinitely; (6) they must
mutually assume responsibility for each other's welfare; and (7) they
must mutually expect that the relationship is exclusive and will endure
over time. 149
Members seeking to designate a beneficiary under the amended
provision could be required to execute an affidavit attesting to the above
elements of the relationship.150 The affidavit would be kept confiden
tial151 and should name the domestic partner, as it is after all a desig
nation of beneficiary form. If the designation is later challenged, the
Board will determine the validity of the designation. As this article has
shown, the retirement statute already provides for numerous situations
in which the Board may have to make factual determinations, 152 so a
new responsibility should not be a significant burden on the Board.
147. MAss. GEN. L . ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992).
~
148. Id.
149. See Exec. Order No. 340, supra note 134.
150. It should be noted that this involves a significantly greater degree ofintrusion
into the relationship of the individuals involved than is currently the case under the
joint and Last Survivor Allowance of§ 12(2) Option (c). For example, if a person
designates his spouse to receive survivor benefits under Option (c), the spouse
automatically can receive the benefits regardless of whether the parties even live
together or whether the parties' relationship is characterized by mutual support and
caring, or whether the relationship is exclusive. See Mary Ann Case, Couples and
Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian
and Gay R ights, 79 VA. L. REv. 1643, 1664-66 (1993). In addition, the affidavit would
give local retirement boards significant private information about members. nus is
an argument for simply eliminating all limitations on choice of beneficiaries for
section 12(2) Option (c). See supra note 133.
151. Any such affidavit would contain personal data and should be protected from
disclosure under the public records law. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4 , § 2 (cl. 26(c)) (1992).
However, complete protection of the material would be difficult to ensure.
152. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992). Under this provision, for
example, if a member has not designated a spouse as a beneficiary, the spouse and
member were not living together at the time of the member's death, and the spouse
elects to obtain survivor benefits, the Board decides if the separation was justifiable
or not. Under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 32, § 9(3)(a) (1992), the Board
would decide whether a widowed sister who lived with a member who died from an
accident at work, is totally dependent upon him. See id. § 12(2)(d). See supra note
122.

. .. .. .......... - .. .. . . . . .... ... -.. -
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While Governor Weld's Executive Order does not deal with
situations in which a domestic partnership has ended, other policies have
dealt with that issue. The University of Chicago, which provides health
coverage and other benefits for domestic partners, 155 uses a form enti
tled "Statement of Tennination of Domestic Partnership" which treats
such a termination as equivalent to a divorce, terminating items such as
library privileges but allowing the ex-domestic partner to continue health
insurance benefits for thirty-six months after termination. 154 In the
retirement context, a similar form could be drafted that would terminate
the designation of the beneficiary.155
These provisions would establish a clear standard for determining
whether a person with whom a member lived and had a relationship was
the member's "domestic partner." The Board would not be required to
become involved in individual determinations except in extraordinary
circumstances.
It should be emphasized that this statutory change should not cost
the Commonwealth any additional funds because all of the options

153. The University of Chicago, Personnel Policy Guidelines, § U401.01 Uan. 11,
1993) (on file with author).
The University of Chicago defines "domestic partnership.. as:
two individuals of the same gender who live together in a long-term
relationship of indefinite duration, with an exclusive mutual commitment
in which the Partners agree to be jointly responsible for each other's
common welfare and share financial obligations. The Partners may not be
related by blood to a degree of closeness which would prohibit legal mar
riage in the state in which they legally reside.
University of Chicago, Office of StaffBenefits, Questions and Answers for Domestic
Partnerships Uan. 15, 1993) (on file with author). The University requires both
members of the domestic partnership to sign a statement certifying that they fall
within the above definition. In the section where the partners certify that they are
jointly responsible for each other's common welfare and share obligations, the
statement provides that such joint responsibility:
may be demonstrated by the existence of three of the following. We have
circled below the types of documentation that we can provide if requested.
[a] Domestic Partnership Agreement[;] [b) Joint mortgage or lease[;] [c)
Designation of domestic partner as beneficiary for life insurance and
retirement contract[;] [d] Designation of domestic partner as primary
beneficiary in ... will[;] [e] Durable property and health care powers of
attorney[;] [£]Joint ownership of motor vehicle, joint checking account, or
joint credit account.
University of Chicago, Office of Staff Benefits, Statement of Domestic Partnership,
Questions and Answers on Domestic Partnerships (Jan. 15 1993) (on file with
author).
154. Id. f 4.
155. If a member had informed the Board that the relationship was over, the
fonner domestic partner could .not claim the Member-Survivor Allowance under
section 12(2) Option {d). See supra text accompanying notes 40, 124-32.
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under section 12(b) are actuarially equivalent.156 Employees who
currently have "domestic partners" have simply been forced to choose
other options basically equivalent in cost to the state. 157
2. Allowing a Domestic Partner to Elect the Receive the Member
Survivor Allowance in the Same Circumstances in which a Spouse
May Do So
The current retirement statute provides that a member's surviving
spouse can elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, so long as
the member has not already designated someone else and certain other
requirements are met.158 Given the proposed requirements for do
mestic partnership, a domestic partner should be able to elect to receive
a survivor's allowance-as long as the member has not designated
someone else. This latter supposition, however, could create the
administrative problem of a person or persons claiming, after a
member's death, to have been the domestic partner of the deceased
employee. This benefit perhaps should not be implemented until the
proposed changes to retirement allowance beneficiary provisions are in
effect for some time. Perhaps regulations could be promulgated that
establish what a person claiming the benefit would need to prove in
order to prevail. Examples might include registration as a domestic part
ner with the decedent under a local ordinance, joint ownership ofassets,
and other factors. 159 If the parties were living together at the time of
the member's death, and the survivor can establish that he or she was
the domestic partner of the decedent, then the partner should be able
to elect to obtain the benefit. If the parties were not living together at
the time of the member's death, the Board must find that they were

156. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 98-102.
.
157. Because principles of fairness are involved, the fact that this proposal might
cost the Commonwealth slightly more to administer the retirement system by
including domestic partnership survivor allowances should not be fatal. See Report
from Stanford University's Subcommittee on Domestic Partners' Benefits,June 1992,
§ 3 (on file with author).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 124-32. The requirements include that
the spouse and member must have been manied for at least a year and must have
been living together at the time of the member's death. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32,
§§ 12(2)(c), 12B {1992). If they were not living together at the time of the member's
death, the Board must conclude that they had been living apart for ':justifiable cause
other than desertion or moral turpitude on the part of the [surviving] spouse" for
the benefits to be provided. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) {1992).
159. For example, the University of Chicago policy discussed above contains a list
of a number of objective criteria designed to determine the existence of a domestic
partnership, such as joint property ownership, designation of each other as primary
beneficiary in wills, designation of each other as power ofattorney, and so forth. See
supra note 153.
·
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living apart for a justifiable cause other than desertion on the part of the
surviving domestic partner. 160
3. Allow Domestic Partners to Receive Accidental Death Benefits in
the Same Circumstances in Which Spouses May Receive Such
Benefits
Given the requirements for a relationship to be considered a
domestic partnership as outlined above, it is reasonable to apply
generally the same standards to the receipt of accidental death benefits
by spouses as by domestic partners.161 This is particularly true when
one considers that the definition of domestic partner contained in this
article is more closely tailored to that of a relationship of actual depen
dence or interdependence than that contained in the existing statute.
A spousal relationship does not necessarily include all of the elements
required for a nonspousal couple to meet the definition of "domestic
partner.'' 162 The benefits would be paid to the surviving spouse or
domestic partner who had been designated as the beneficiary under the
Joint and Last Survivor and Member Survivor Allowance provisions.
That person would receive the benefits provided that the couple had
been living together at the time of the member's death, or if the Board
finds that the couple had been not living together at the time of the me
mber's death due to the desertion of such domestic partner by the
member. 163 The benefit could be extended to an individual designated
by a member before death as a domestic partner and eventually to a per
son who could establish the existence of a domestic partnership at the
time of death. 164 The benefit should terminate if a surviving domestic
160. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). See supra text accompanying
notes 126-30. This provision should not involve the Board in burdensome factual
detenninations any more than the existing statute does, in circumstances where the
member has not designated anyone, the couple was living apart, and the surviving
member of the couple claims to be entitled to the allowance. See supra text
accompanying notes 125-28. It is not suggested that the phrase "moral turpitude"
be included in these amendments, indeed perhaps it should not be included in the
statute. As noted above, the statute contains several contexts in which the phrase
"moral turpitude" appears, but nowhere is the term defined.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
164. Generally, an employee who has a domestic partner and wishes to provide for
him or her will hopefully fill out the appropriate beneficiary form. In the context
of "accidental death benefits," which are paid automatically to the member's spouse
if they were living together, § 9(1), even if the member had not filled out any benefi
ciary form under § 12(2) Option (c), it is important to provide the opportunity for
a surviving domestic partner to establish the existence of the relationship for
pwposes of the accidental death provisions since no opportunity for automatic
payment of the benefit exists. Perhaps the statute instead should allow employees
to select a beneficiary for these benefits.
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partner enters a new relationship in the nature of a domestic partner
ship, iust as the benefit terminates when a surviving spouse remar

ries.16~

VI.

CONCLUSION

The retirement statute contains rules which are in certain respects
too rigid to apply fairly to all of the Commonwealth's public employees
and their families. For example, the system contains strict restrictions
on who an employee may designate as a beneficiary of his or her retire
ment allowance, limiting it to certain specific relatives, re~dless of the
closeness or lack of closeness in the actual relationship. 66 Moreover,
the actual relationship of the parties can limit benefits, e.g., the Member
Survivor Allowance cannot be claimed by a surviving spouse who
deserted the deceased spouse. 167 Thus, in some respects, the retire
ment system reflects the fact that simple "bright line" familial relation
ships such as marriage may not always be sufficient to determine fairly
who should receive benefits. At the same time, the system unjustifiably
places limitations on who an employee can designate as a beneficiary, in
disregard of the actual nature of relationships, which may be just as
intimate and involve as much financial dependence as relationships
within a legally recognized family.
Certain amendments could and should be made in the retirement
statute to create a clear category of "domestic partner" for employee
members.168 This provision would allow members to designate a
person who could receive the portion of their pension available to
designated surviving family members under the Joint and Last Survivor
and Member Survivor beneficiary provisions.169 A designated domestic
partner should also be able to receive accidental death benefits.170 The
designation of "domestic partner" should not involve the Board or the
courts in any more case-by-case determinations about member's rela
tionships than the existing statute already requires. ~71

165. See supra text accompanying note 130. While enforcement of this rule could
be difficult for domestic partners, enforcement ofthe lose-benefits·if-you·remarryrule
must be difficult too, because how will the Commonwealth know that a surviving
spouse has remarried? Presumably receipt of surviving spouse accidental death
benefits is conditioned upon the recipient's agreement to inform the Board if she
remarries and provides for forfeiture if she does not so inform the Board. This rule
could be extended to recipients of domestic partner accidental death benefits.
166. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c), Option (d) (1992).
167. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52, 158-60.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65.
171. See supra text accompanying note 126. See also Donnelly v. Contributory
Retirement Appeals Bd.• 15 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 443 N.E.2d 416 (1982). discussed
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These changes should not result in a significant monetary burden on
the Commonwealth, since the retirement allowance options under
section 12(2), Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General Laws are all
actuarially equivalent.172 The proposed changes would not be difficult
to administer, and indeed are in many respects similar to systems already
operating in other contexts.m The proposed changes provide a
practical opportunity to improve further the retirement system and to
remedy the inequities it unfortunately still promotes. 174

supra note 116. The rarity of reported cases on issues such as whether parties were
"living together" suggests that litigation on such issues is relatively infrequent.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 134:43.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 133-65.

